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There is a sense in which poetry can re-inscribe humans in their natu
ral surroundings, but language—even poetic language—is also always
problematic. In conversation with and in response to recent works by
David Abram, I will delineate at least two ways in which poetic lan
guage separates and distinguishes humans from nature. I also argue
for the importance of what is implicit or invisible (as opposed to tan
gible and sensuous). Language is a mode of human responsibility for the
world, not just a sign or result of being part of it.

“Surely any genuine phenomenology, after Merleau-Ponty, must also take
form as a poetics,” writes David Abram in “Between the Body and the Breath
ing Earth�”1 His earlier book The Spell of the Sensuous urged environmental
philosophy toward a more attentive, poetic engagement with nature� But what
is “poetics”? In The Spell of the Sensuous, Abram traces the gradual alienation
of the West from nature through the development of writing from pictograms
to the Greek alphabet� Indigenous cultures, in contrast, exemplify alternative
ways of living out the relationship between humans and the “more-than-human
world” that are less anthropocentric and more attuned to the sensible world�
While I agree with Abram that humans should understand themselves to live
in a world full of other beings who communicate, experience, and express our
shared world, I challenge two claims drawn from Abram’s book and more re
cent article� These claims suggest a dangerous misunderstanding of the sense
in which poetry and literary works of art can help to “re-inscribe” humans in
their surrounding world� My paper is an attempt to explain the strange sense in
which poetry can do this, but I will first delineate two ways in which it cannot
do so�
1� David Abram, “Between the Body and the Breathing Earth: A Reply to Ted Toadvine,” Environmental Ethics 27, no� 2 (Summer 2005): 171–90�
Environmental Philosophy 5 (1), 23–36.
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First, Abram claims that poetry does not draw attention to itself but rath
er moves the reader or hearer directly to the sensible world� One of Abram’s
main concerns is to show how conceptual or scientific language does not do
this, because the signs that evolved from pictograms drew attention toward
themselves instead of directing attention toward the sensible world� The hu
man task becomes, through poetic language, to re-inscribe ourselves in this
sensible world by understanding it as communicative and expressive� In the
next section, I will argue—drawing on Aharon Appelfeld, Robert Sokolowski,
and Mikel Dufrenne—that poetry does the opposite of what Abram hopes: it
draws attention to itself rather than turning it toward the visible world� In other
words, I will argue that poetry can be even less a means of directing our atten
tion back to the natural world as an ordinary sign� Second, and closely related
to the first point, Abram argues that poetry heals a divide that should never
have existed—and did not always exist—between mind and world� I will argue
in reply, drawing primarily on Martin Heidegger, that the tension and conflict
between mind and world, possible and real, belongs to all language—especial
ly to poetry� It does not appear (as if from nowhere) with the development of a
certain kind of language, such as writing� Instead, the experience of separation
between consciousness and its surrounding world is intrinsic to all language
because it is intrinsic to experience itself� In all language—especially poetic
language – that schism, conflict, or tension finds its expression or embodiment.
My thesis, then, is that poetic language neither (1) directs our attention back
to the real, sensible world nor (2) heals a divide between abstract thought and
experience� I do agree with Abram that poetry plays an important role in un
derstanding the human place in nature, but for opposite reasons� I will describe
how poetry awakens human consciousness from the real to and for the possible
(or even impossible)� In this way, poetry acknowledges, expresses, and even
affirms a gap between mind and world, possible and actual, thinking and being,
that belongs essentially to human experience�
What is Poetry?
I would like to address Abram’s two claims in more detail before moving on
to what I think is a better description of the human relation to the non-human
(or “more than human”) world� Abram carefully traces the evolution of signs
from pictograms, detailing how humans distanced themselves from the sen
sible world with each change� For instance, with the introduction of vowels
in Greek writing, written words became nearly self-sufficient, whereas He
brew writing had depended on the reader to supply the “breath” of the vowel
sounds�2 Without turning history backward, Abram does think that poetry can
restore participation of the senses in reading� Poetry draws on imagination,
feeling, and memory of the sensible in ways that prosaic or scientific writing
2� David Abram, The Spell of the Sensuous (New York: Random House, 1996), Ch� 4,
esp� 102�
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does not� However, I do not believe involving the senses in these ways directs
attention any more authentically or concretely to the real, sensible world� In
fact, several philosophers of literature argue the opposite: poetry is expressive
of human experience precisely because it does not point toward real objects in
the world but instead to the possible, impossible, and imaginary�
For example, in the decades following the Holocaust, Aharon Appelfeld
explored language and poetry in search of a response to philosophers like Theodor Adorno who claimed that nothing could be said or written about the Ho
locaust� It was a singular, unspeakable, and indescribable event� Appelfeld,
among others, argued that the way to restore the humanity and uniqueness
of Jews who had been objectified and dehumanized was through literature,
especially fiction. Even more than objective, factual, perhaps “truer” accounts,
literature was able to preserve the unspeakable as unspeakable� In Appelfeld’s
novel For Every Sin, the main character, Theo, wanders after being released
from a concentration camp, encountering strangers and relatives, memories
and the present, indiscriminately�3 Despite the trauma everyone has suffered,
the conversations revolve around “familiar” things (cigarettes, family, music)
which in this context are out of place, even absurd� The novel suggests that
what is needed is not a direct engagement with the event of the Holocaust (the
unfamiliar) or even a return to normalcy (the familiar) so much as a restoration
of the boundaries between familiar and unfamiliar in this next context, restor
ing the privacy and individuality of each person� Because literature is able to
leave much of what it communicates implicit and unspoken, it is the kind of
language that can restore such boundaries�4 The task is not to face the event
but to gather oneself apart from it, where it can remain firmly outside and not
masquerade grotesquely as part of the everyday� Literature is the saving power
not because it promises unity or directs the reader toward concrete events but
because it restores the difference between the human world (of the writer and
readers) and the (invented) events� Ordinary language, on the other hand, just
because it is ordinary, cannot help turning what it describes into part of the
everyday, ordinary, and public�
Poetry attracts thinkers like Abram for the same reason fiction appealed
to Appelfeld: it deals with the unconceptualizable� It is a promising possibil
ity for those concerned with domination of nature by humans and concepts�
Unlike Appelfeld, however, who seeks a clear demarcation of speech and the
unspeakable, Abram is arguing for a similarity among all beings as physical—
perceiving and perceptible. Instead of conflict, there must be solidarity.5 He
thinks that poetry, by attuning us to the sensible qualities of the world, will
re-direct humans to the sensible qualities of nature and restore a relationship
3� Aharon Appelfeld, For Every Sin (New York: Grove Press, 1989)�
4� For more explicit statements of these points, see Aharon Appelfeld, Beyond Despair,
trans� Jeffrey M� Green (New York: Fromm International, 1994), Lecture 3�
5 Abram, Spell, 93�
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with it� But Appelfeld turns to literary language for the opposite reason—to
achieve a distance from his subject (the Holocaust), setting it safely outside
the realm of the human. Moreover, he hopes fiction and poetic language will
restore the boundaries between individual persons, creating a private space that
is not available to all (as numbers and empirical descriptions would be)�6 Ap
pelfeld rejects more objective, statistical accounts of the Holocaust not because
they “abstract” the teller from the events (as Abram would likely point out), but
because it does not place them far enough away� That is, it does not protect a
human, private, and creative space apart from the inevitable, “true” (i�e�, fac
tual) events of the Holocaust� Abram would likewise challenge the use of bare
facts and numbers as more truthful than personal descriptions, but for different
reasons� Abram emphasizes the communicative/expressive aspects of the sen
sible world, especially its possibilities for solidarity� For instance, it would not
include such abstract meanings as “belief,” which cannot be depicted�7 In con
trast, Appelfeld looks to poetry because it expresses the private and interior, or
what can only be expressed in words, rather than what is visible to all�
Appelfeld’s use of setting and space in the novel embody what he believes
creative literature can do. The reader has difficulty in describing any consistent
geography� The setting of For Every Sin would best be described as shifting,
disorienting, deceptive, unstable, and even impossible� It is quite clear that the
novel does not intend to inscribe the reader into any physical, sensible space�
Instead, the novel describes the human interior landscape of confusion and
disorientation, suggesting rather that such inscription is impossible� Poetry is a
way of engaging the events of the Holocaust not because it re-orients humans
in the concrete, sensible world, but because it describes the experience of a
singular, particular human being as separated from it� The depicted landscape
mirrors the human interior, but not because the human being experiences em
pathy with what is external, as Abram suggests�8 Instead, the landscape is re
made into a geography that is physically impossible in order to create such a
resonance or mirroring between human and world� In this case, poetry does not
restore a solidarity or unity between humans and the natural world but rather
restores the private space of individual stories� These stories and experiences
cannot be made public or visible as a real landscape might—except through
words, just because they present what is not sensible and could never be de
picted�
What of Abram’s claim that a sign draws attention to itself while a picture
directs attention to the real world?9 Even if in special cases, such as engaging
with the Holocaust, we want to distance ourselves from the real for the pur
poses of communication, is Abram not generally correct that ordinary prose,
6�
7�
8�
9�

Appelfeld, Beyond Despair, Lecture 3�
Abram, Spell, 98�
Cf� Abram, Spell, 127�
Abram, Spell, 97, 107�
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with its abstractions, introduces an unfortunate distance from the sensible?
Abram claims that poetic language can help restore our relationship to nature
because it allows “our sensory reciprocity with the rest of the sensuous � � � to
come to voice�”10 Abram’s critique of writing is that non-pictorial signs turn
attention away from things in nature and instead to the sign itself�11 Signs (that
is, words, especially the Greek alphabet) are not inherently harmful, but they
demand our attention so much more insistently than the sensible world that
they overpower it�12 By contrast, pictograms that maintain their roots in the
sensible recall attention to the physical things to which they refer—and from
which they originate—in the world�13 Abram is right that there is an important
distinction to be made between words or signs, on the one hand, and pictures
on the other� But is it true that pictures and works of art refer us to the physical,
sensible world while signs entrap us in the human world?
Phenomenologist Robert Sokolowski makes the opposite claim: A picture
of a chair invites the viewer to linger on the picture (to consider its perspec
tive, shading, medium), but the word “chair” directs attention immediately to
the chair it signifies in the world.14 Both words and pictures “presence” a thing,
and words do so with less interference from the word itself� One might point
out that the word refers to an abstract chair while the picture presents a particu
lar one, but that need not be the case� The phrase “my grandmother’s rocking
chair” brings that particular chair to mind� A picture of her chair also brings it
to mind, but the picture invites me at the same time to appreciate this particular
depiction (perhaps as my little brother draws it)� In fact, there may be no real
thing depicted at all� Sokolowski writes of a painting of a kettle, “I can still
refer to ‘the’ kettle depicted in my painting, and when I do so I need not refer
to a kettle in some storage cabinet; I mean the one in the painting�”15 In what
way, then, do pictures return us to the real world?
I do not mean that a picture and word equally involve the senses or emo
tions� A painting of a haystack makes present the colors and angles of a real
haystack, and—if the painter is a real painter—something of the bodily feel
ing of vastness I have when standing in a field that has a haystack. Looking
at the picture involves and awakens my senses in a way that staring at the
word “haystack” on my wall would not� Sokolowski agrees: pictures evoke
the bodily response we would have in the presence of the real thing�16 But just
because a picture is itself a thing occupying space that invites our attention,
it does not turn us (the viewers) to the real, sensible world but encourages us
10� Abram, “Between the Body,” 190�
11� Abram, Spell, 97�
12 Ibid�, 178�
13� Ibid�, 97�
14� Robert Sokolowski, Pictures, Quotations, and Distinctions (Notre Dame: Univer
sity of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 21�
15� Ibid�, 21�
16� Ibid�, 15�

28

eleanor d. helMS

to stand looking at the picture� It may awaken us to our senses in general, or
produce the feelings we would have in the presence of the real object, but it is
not obvious that good art helps attune us to the natural world. Why go to a field
to see a haystack at sunset myself when Monet has depicted it here so well? A
picture can lure us away from nature as well as does a sign—even more so, if
it is a better substitute�
Yet Abram argues that a work of art, especially poetry, can restore the hu
man relation to the sensible, healing the rift caused by signs which—with the
introduction of vowels—became too self-sufficient, introducing a “reflexivity”
between the writer and her own writing�17 Somehow poetic writing will free
humans from this absorption with signs; in this way, it is more like a picture
than a sign� I agree with Abram that poetry (and any literary work of art) is
more like a picture than a sign, but precisely for that reason it—like a picture—
draws attention to itself� Mikel Dufrenne, another philosopher of literature,
affirms that drawing attention to itself instead of to the real world is essential
to any work of art, including poetry�18 The truth of a work of art (or aesthetic
object) is internal to the work and cannot be verified in experience. Dufrenne
writes,
Any work which attempts to be true in terms of the external world and not in
terms of itself, that is, any work which claims that its meaning is verified in
reality because it takes account of reality (either by calling us to know the real
or by inciting us to act in a concrete way), is not an aesthetic object�19

Dufrenne explicitly contrasts aesthetic objects (such as poetry) with signs,
which “disappear behind the signification they present.”20 A sign refers to a
thing in the world and “disappears” behind the thing; it has fulfilled its task
of making the thing present� In contrast, the aesthetic object remains with us,
demanding attention, drawing us not to the world but to a meaning internal to
the work of art� How can poetry help us be “reinscribed” back into the real,
sensible world when—like all art—it covets our attention for itself? This was
just Abram’s criticism of signs, but I am arguing that it is actually more true of
pictures, painting, and poetry�
This would be a problem if the task were, as Abram thinks, to restore a re
lationship with the real and sensible world through poetry, which was distorted
by appropriating language as a peculiarly human characteristic� Instead, I will
argue that the task is to acknowledge more fully our peculiar human respon
sibility for nature, grounded in our ability to imagine possibilities beyond the
real� Poetry is important not because it restores humans to our actual surround
17� Abram, Spell, 107�
18� Mikel Dufrenne, The Phenomenology of Aesthetic Experience, trans� Edward S�
Casey et al� (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 122�
19� Ibid�, 116�
20� Ibid�, 123�
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ings but because it encourages the dreaming of the unreal, allowing us to orient
ourselves toward the future and toward possibilities which may never come�
Poetic thinking is full of “what if,” and it is this “what if” aspect of humans that
enables us to imagine new solutions for current problems� It also enables us to
frustrate or deny our immediate desires for comfort, ease of living, or foods we
enjoy if we perceive that they endanger the survival of other species or our own
future survival� This ability to act for the good of the whole, including other
species, is a peculiarly human responsibility, made possible by our ability to
see our own existence as contingent�
From Appelfeld and Dufrenne we learn two things about poetry, each of
which has a bearing on Abram’s first claim above. First, poetry does not tend
toward unity but establishes boundaries between the familiar and unfamiliar�
Second, it does not direct us to nature (the real, sensible world) but solicits our
attention for itself, for a meaning internal to the work of art that is expressed
in the sensuous aspects of the art, not the world� In what way does having our
senses awakened to a poem—besides a general reminder that we have sens
es—bring us any closer to being part of a more-than-human world? I do think
that poetry can restore a relationship between humans and the world, but only
as it draws attention to the difference between humans and the non-human and
so to a human responsibility to “belong to” and “keep watch” over nature—as
I will elaborate below� Abram’s primary emphasis on the similarity (or solidar
ity) between humans and other beings risks obscuring the peculiar capabilities
and responsibilities of humans� I will argue that, although participating sensu
ally in a poem does not direct us to participate or belong to the real, natural
world, poetry does awaken us to a sense of responsibility that underlies the
human place in nature� An important philosopher to address on the role of
art in human participation in the world, of course—particularly if it entails
a sense of oneself as contingent—is Heidegger� I will argue that Heidegger
agrees with Appelfeld that poetry preserves boundaries between familiar and
unfamiliar and with Dufrenne that it does so just by drawing attention to itself
rather than referring to things in the real, sensible world� Through Heidegger,
I will develop an account of language that explains why it is both the problem
and the solution to the problem of human alienation (considered precisely as
Abram does, as abstraction) from the more than human world� In doing so,
I affirm that language belongs—in important ways—exclusively to humans,
as the origin of our responsibility to and for the world� It does not follow that
language can be used to justify exploitation or domination, as I will address in
my concluding section�
Heidegger: Poetry and World
As discussed above, Sokolowski does write that art “presences” the real world�21
Why then does it not, as Abram suggests, direct its viewers toward the sensible
21� Sokolowski, 15�

30

eleanor d. helMS

and real? Sokolowski goes on to explain that pictures “make present” what is
real only by also making possible its absence—that is, for example, by intro
ducing the possibility that there is no real kettle at all� Sokolowski writes,
Only because we have become the kind of being that uses names, only be
cause we have come to distinguish between a thing and the presence of the
thing, can we take something as a picture of that thing: then we achieve the
presence of the thing without having the thing itself there�22

To the extent that pictures do “make present” the real world, they also draw at
tention to the possibility of its absence� I argue in this section that all language,
even poetic, brings the possibility (even anxiety) of absence—that is, of con
tingency�
In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Van Gogh’s painting discloses the
human world and how Heidegger thinks Earth appears (just as what does not
appear) in relation to it� Heidegger agrees with Dufrenne that a work of art
does not refer to real things in the world but instead makes present a whole
world� The shoes depicted in Van Gogh’s painting have meaningful reference
in a world of tools and work� The shoes are useful to the peasant woman be
cause they are a “reliable” part of her world� Through the painting, by contrast,
we become aware of these familiar relations as a world and may also become
aware that we, too, have such a world of familiar landscapes and useful things
that structure our daily activities� We do not come to this awareness by being
attentive to any particular part of our familiar, reliable world� By looking for
the shoes if they are missing, or having to repair them, they could become
“conspicuous” in the woman’s world—just like the hammer in Being and
Time. But the fact of not being able to find a hammer or pair of shoes does not
usually—or perhaps ever—result in a new, authentic awareness that we live in
a world full of things that exist as part of a meaningful web of relations� That
awareness, Heidegger thinks, involves an awareness not just that any object
may break or be lost but that the whole world as world depends on the human
being who lives and works, for whom the things have meaning� Because Van
Gogh’s painting gathers the world as world in this way, it enables us to see and
attend to these relations. As depicting a single thing (such as a kettle) affirms
the possibility of its absence making present a whole world (as Van Gogh has
managed to do, albeit by painting just one part of it), Heidegger thinks that Van
Gogh has captured the contingency of that world—and of “world” itself�
Heidegger makes the strong claim in Being and Time that there is no world
without humans to gather it�23 It is tempting to take the later Heidegger’s “Keh
re” as simply a reversal of this subjective beginning, as Abram seems to have
22� Ibid�, 24�
23� Heidegger writes in “The Thing” (in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans� Albert
Hofstadter [New York: HarperCollins, 1971]): “When and in what way do things ap
pear as things? They do not appear by means of human making� But neither do they ap
pear without the vigilance of mortals” (181)� He concludes, “Men alone, as mortals, by
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done� Because Abram wants to attend primarily to the style of philosophers24—
or, in Abram’s words, “to accomplish a creative reading”25—I have tried to
address Abram’s ideas directly rather than question their origin in Heidegger
or Merleau-Ponty� Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, far from softening his
emphasis in Being and Time on the relation between human beings and world,
Heidegger states explicitly in the later work that animals do not have a world�26
It is only with Being and Time as a background and these later, explicit articu
lations of world that we can understand what Heidegger means by “gathering”
and “world” in texts like “The Origin of the Work of Art�” Animals do have
concerns and familiar, meaningful objects, and they can refer to these objects
or mourn their absence� Yet in “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” Heidegger
writes, “Men alone, as mortals, by dwelling attain to the world as world�”27
What would world be, in this sense? Abram emphasizes the similarity between
humans and animals because he wants to avoid abstraction and objectification
of one’s environment� But humans gather and dwell in a world, in this Heideg
gerian sense, precisely because they can abstract themselves from it� That is,
humans can see both its continued existence and their place in it as contingent,
disclosed as nothingingness in the face of their mortality�28 The capacity to
see the world as a web of relation is just the same ability to see oneself apart
from it, of perhaps severing those relations (as certainly happens in death)� I
am arguing here that this realization is also a condition for understanding the
world as one’s responsibility—that is, as something that must be maintained�
The artist who can gather the world of a peasant woman into a work of art can
also see it as someone’s world� “I,” the viewer or artist, am not in the paintdwelling attain to the world as world� Only what conjoins itself out of world becomes
a thing” (182)�
24� Abram, “Between the Body,” 190�
25� “Merleau-Ponty and the Voices of the Earth,” in Minding Nature: The Philosophers
of Ecology, ed� David McCauley (New York: Guilford Press, 1996), 83� Quoted in Ted
Toadvine, “Limits of the Flesh: The Role of Reflection in David Abram’s Ecophenom
enology,” Environmental Ethics 27, no� 2 (Summer 2005): 155-70�
26� See Introduction to Metaphysics, trans� Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale, 1959),
45� Heidegger does write in Introduction to Metaphysics that animals have an “impov
erished” world� The difference is not a softening of the claim but rather a different sense
of “world�” Animals certainly have purposes, projects, concerns, needs, and familiar
things—but because they do not suffer anxiety over their death or even curiosity regard
ing their origin, they do not become aware of their world “as world�” If we are wrong,
and they do so, then perhaps they can help us in gathering it� But we cannot build an
ethics on the possibility that they can—both because so many things we also want to
protect clearly cannot (trees, canyons) and because it distracts attention from the fact
that “gathering world” is not a privilege we should fight over but something we need
to be actively doing.
27� Heidegger, “The Thing,” 182�
28� Heidegger, Being and Time, trans� Joan Stambaugh (New York: SUNY, 1996), 255,
283–85�
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ing� The shoes in the painting are not mine� I realize that her world is a world
because she is the center of it—not because she masters it, but because she
lives in it and cares for it� The peasant woman’s world is held together by—or
simply is—her work� The peasant woman might herself see this, but insofar as
she does so, she abstracts� That is, she sees her world as belonging to her rather
than herself as a part of it, related to it as any other part to a whole�
This human, Heideggerian world, then—as distinct from an animal’s
world—has as the condition for its possibility the peasant’s (or the artist’s)
own ability to see this world as hers and so as dependent on her activities� That
is, knowing that it is hers is no different from the ability to abstract herself from
it� As Heidegger is fond of repeating in various forms (especially in his discus
sion of “enframing” [Ge-stell] in “The Question Concerning Technology”),
the possibility of losing the world, because it depends on work and activity, is
also the possibility of keeping it� An authentic relationship with nature is pos
sible only as we understand that it is in an important way contingent� Namely,
we understand our relationship to world only as we confront our own mortality,
understanding for the first time the sense in which this meaningful nexus of
relations is ours�29
This point is made more negatively by Max Scheler in Man’s Place in
Nature� In this late work, Scheler argues that reason and abstraction allow
humans—unlike animals—to frustrate their own drives�30 Reason allows them
to see the whole as whole and place themselves in it, which in turn makes it
possible for them to sacrifice their own desires for the good of others.31 His
important insight is that humans must demand something of ourselves which
we would never demand of animals� We would never expect animals to vol
untarily curb their populations, construct smaller dwellings, challenge their
food sources, or consume fewer (or different) resources for the good of other
species, especially if no negative effects were immediately apparent� But we
environmentalists do not hesitate to demand these sacrifices of ourselves, and
to look askance—perhaps even with bewilderment—at those who refuse to
participate� Then at the same time we encourage these same others to under
stand that they are not outside nature but part of it� How can humans both see
themselves as part of nature and the bearers of this strange responsibility to
act in ways that do not come naturally—i.e., to use resources more efficiently,
think of the good of other species, and produce fewer of the things they want?
Do humans have a peculiar role and responsibility, not reflected or modeled by
the rest of nature—or not?
If humans do have a peculiar responsibility for the rest of nature, what
does it look like? Both Heidegger and Scheler emphasize the importance of
29� See especially Heidegger’s description of Angst in Being and Time, 176, 177�
30� Max Scheler, Man’s Place in Nature, trans� Hans Meyerhoff (New York: The Noon
day Press, 1961), 40–46�
31� Ibid�, 44
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modality for the human relationship to world� Through reason—even abstrac
tion—a human being can recognize her own relationships as actual but not
necessary and so as something which she is responsible to maintain� What does
this have to do with poetry? Poetry and other works of art have in common not
merely that they express—as Abram emphasizes—but that they are creative�
The human ability to dwell in different modalities (the possible and even im
possible or fantastic) means that humans can create disorienting spaces for dif
ficult truths (like Appelfeld), write poems with internal harmony whose truth
does not depend on comparison with reality (cf� Dufrenne), and even imagine
a world without oneself in it, weighing the effects of one’s own actions and
whether or not they are sustainable� These tasks and possibilities delimit ways
in which it does not make sense to say simply that “language speaks” without
reminding, as Heidegger also does, that—in peculiar and important ways—
humans speak� Our speaking, or our peculiar manner of it, brings with it a kind
or degree of responsibility that does not belong to the rest of the more-than
human world�
Owning and Preserving the Unowned
Some environmental philosophers are wary of speaking of human responsibil
ity because it seems a throwback to talk of “dominion” and “domination�” The
difficulty is that many words which we need to describe our own place in na
ture have become contaminated with negative associations� One of these words
is “ownership�” Is there a way of speaking of “ownership”—that is, the world
as one’s “own”—without turning the world into an object or possession? The
Heideggerian insight that humans gather world is made concrete by Erazim
Kohák in The Embers and the Stars, where he writes that the task for humans
is to let things “belong”—a task which we often neglect� The possibility of
“belonging” is neither possession nor a merely sentimental attitude� Kohák’s
example is the difference between a mass-produced toy panda bear and a toy
a child loves and names—in other words, which is attended to and cared for�32
Kohák also alludes to a proverb that an extra coat hanging in my closet does
not properly “belong” to me but to the homeless person who needs it� We are
rightfully wary of any philosophy that turns nature into a human possession,
but we should not let the language frighten us away from this notion of “be
longing,” through which we are able to see that “domination” of the natural
world is not the only danger� What if our alienation from the natural world is
instead a result of not letting our human world belong to us in the rich sense
described by Kohák?
Attending to “world” is not just an inward turn to the inner life of con
sciousness, which would be a neglect of what goes on outside our human
homes and cities� Rather, Heidegger describes “earth” as that which appears
32� Erazim Kohák, The Embers and the Stars (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1984), 128�
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at the edges of world� Each one of the fourfold “means” all four, such that a
failure to attend to and “gather” world would mean there is nowhere for earth
to appear� In “The Origin of the Work of Art,” Heidegger contrasts “world”
and “earth,” describing each as being disclosed or “unconcealed” just in their
contrast to one another� It is in relation to the temple as a space built by mortals
in worship of the gods that earth is disclosed as that remaining unenclosed
by world� In contrast to world—the world of human construction, work, and
familiarity—earth remains unfamiliar and wild� A kind of “relation” is estab
lished between world and earth through the boundary, but precisely in their
difference and unrelatability� That is, we come to understand that humans have
a task of “keeping watch”33—which is not a call to re-awaken our senses but to
understand the dangers and possibilities that belong exclusively to humans as
the beings who gather world�
These boundaries and contrasts address Abram’s second claim, above:
that poetry can heal the rift between humans and the more-than-human world
that emerged historically and empirically through technological developments�
Though Abram is correct in a certain sense—as I will elaborate—that language
is to blame for our alienation from nature, he looks to an anthropological ac
count of the development of language through history, as if the problem did
not essentially relate to language as such� Heidegger writes, in contrast, that
all language conceals; the best poetry can do is acknowledge that there is this
concealment or “let the veil appear as what veils�”34 The problem is not with
a certain kind of language (an alphabet with or without vowels) but a conflict
inherent in language itself—that is, to human participation in the world�35 Even
33� Cf� “The Question Concerning Technology,”in The Question Concerning Technol
ogy and Other Essays, trans� William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977)�
34� Ibid�, 25�
35� Maurice Merleau-Ponty, another philosopher Abram turns to for support, makes
this point most strikingly� In Signs, he writes: “Man does not paint painting, but he
speaks about speech, and the spirit of language wants to depend on nothing but itself”
(trans� Richard C� McCleary [Evanston: Northwestern Univ� Press, 1964], 80)� That
the “spirit of language” wants to be independent implies that Merleau-Ponty would not
accept Abram’s historical-anthropological account of writing, as if a mistaken sense of
human independence from nature arose with the development of a certain kind of al
phabet but was not at work already in language itself� Furthermore, for Merleau-Ponty
there is a conflict between consciousness and sensible appearance that occurs in every
perception (i�e�, positing) of an object, as he insists throughout the Phenomenology of
Perception, but also The Visible and The Invisible, as is emphasized by Douglas Low�
This conflict is the possibility of abstract thought, despite his agreement with Abram
that thought is not first abstract but begins in and never escapes experience. MerleauPonty writes: “But precisely because my body can shut itself off from the world, it is
also what opens me out upon the world and places me in a situation there” (191)� For
more on the conflict between consciousness and appearance that occurs in every per
ception, see also Douglas Low, “The Continuity Between Merleau-Ponty’s Early and
Late Philosophy of Language,” Journal of Philosophical Research 17 (1992)�
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though Heidegger describes the humans who gather world as themselves gath
ered in and by the fourfold, he preserves a task for mortals that is not done
reversibly or reciprocally by earth or sky; instead, it is by assuming our dis
tinctive (mortal) place in the fourfold that we let ourselves be gathered� Nature
becomes silent to us because we do not understand our own language, our own
activity of “worlding” and participation in the world by gathering it and keep
ing watch over it� Abram understands that language is both the solution and the
problem; he does not see that it is the nature of language always to be both a
solution and a problem�
Without simply saying that what Heidegger means by “earth” is convert
ible with the physical planet and nature, as Abram does,36 we can use Heideg
ger’s distinctions to critique the present preoccupation with “moral standing”
in environmental philosophy� Though I cannot develop this critique here, the
practical result of the aesthetic-Heideggerian environmental philosophy I am
describing would be a shift of concern from moral standing and the human’s
part in a larger whole (i�e�, deep ecology) to cultivating a distinctively human
relation to our own artifacts and activities, thereby preserving that which re
mains outside our human activity as mysterious and unowned� Any dialogue
that begins where humans and the rest of nature are already in competition for
resources begins too late; it cannot help turning nature into a standing-reserve,
no matter how many rights are protected� But if we attend to and “keep watch”
over our own activities, we will know whether the loss of a forest for timber
is a sorrowful necessity or whether it is being cut down to lower the price of
toothpicks. A debate over the use of a field that considers only the “moral
standing” of that field and its inhabitants cannot be meaningful or persuasive
because we do not understand how we are already involved with it� Develop
ing a deeper aesthetic sense of the beauty of the field might be helpful in some
cases, but it might also just be a distraction from the question of our own con
sumption, work, and what we can reasonably expect ourselves—or others—to
“let be�”
I have made a transition here from poetry to thinking—even “calculative
thinking�” With the later Heidegger, I believe the most interesting thing about
poetry is that it is always on the verge of becoming metaphysics without actu
ally doing so� It is this danger which is the source of its saving power� Our sense
of our own human responsibility is always on the verge of becoming domina
tion, and this is a danger we must continue to struggle against� Nevertheless,
the fact that we fall into domination is not merely an accident of history—it is
rather a distortion of our essential task and responsibility� Heidegger describes
this struggle nowhere more clearly than in “The Question Concerning Technol
ogy,” where Gestell is bound inextricably with Gelassenheit�
Abram’s conclusion, too, is that writing—despite being the source of our
alienation from nature—can also be the solution� Why should this be? Abram
36� Abram, Spell, 206ff�
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can offer little justification for its saving power except that we are here now
and should make the best of it� Heidegger, on the other hand, can offer an ex
planation and description of this human struggle at the boundary between po
etry and metaphysics, which exists wherever there is authentic language of any
kind� He echoes Kierkegaard’s insight that what is different in the end must
have been different in the beginning�37 If writing is the path toward human reinscription in the rest of nature, it has always been so; if it is a danger, it has
always been so� The danger is not empirical but essential to what language is:
a naming and claiming of the world as familiar and ours� Though Abram’s in
sights may be valuable in critiquing the notion of a Cartesian subject in empty
space, I am more concerned with another danger, one which perhaps could
only have arisen as philosophers began to emphasize “flesh,” silence, solidar
ity, and reciprocity� This emerging danger is, namely, mistaking ourselves for
simply a part of the world rather than those who can abstract ourselves from
it and so are responsible for and to it in a different—as I have said, peculiar—
way� In Heidegger’s terms, in facing our own mortality, we are the ones who
can understand ourselves and our actions as contingent, opening ourselves to
new possibilities and the cessation of current destructive activities� These new
possibilities, and the possibility of abstraction, come with a price: it is unfor
tunately possible for us to dwell only in our own abstractions and shape the
world to match them� As suggested above, even poetic language is on the verge
of becoming metaphysics (here simply abstraction) and risks leaving physics
behind forever� It is the nature of language—human language, with its ten
dency toward abstraction—to be both a solution and a problem� Language is a
doubling, a making, and itself a thing—though not merely a thing� Neverthe
less, it is our poiesis—our authentic making—which allows us both to dwell in
the world and keep watch over it� It would be unfortunate if a naïve optimism
in the possibilities of poetic language were to distract poets and philosophers
from the complex dangers that language always brings to experience� I worry
that Abram, by separating the danger of prose and metaphysics from the saving
power of poetry and expression, misunderstands both� I have instead outlined
some ways in which language, as it speaks, calls us to understand our peculiar,
human responsibility for the world and our precarious place in it�

37� “Otherwise the story must have been different from the beginning and been differ
ent as it went along, not merely becoming different at the end�” Kierkegaard, Purity of
Heart is to Will One Thing: Spiritual Preparation for the Office of Confession, trans�
Douglas V� Steere (New York: Harper and Row, 1948), 35�

